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We consider a federation in which citizens determine by federal majority rule a dis-
cretionary policy space which partially restricts the sovereignty of member states.
Citizens ￿rst vote on the size of the discretionary space (the degree of local discre-
tion), and then on its location on the policy space (the federal directive). Finally,
each state votes on its respective policy within the discretionary space. This federal
mechanism allows voters to express directly their trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility and
policy harmonization.
We show that at the voting equilibrium, the federal directive is negatively sensitive
to the preferences of nonmedian voters. Moreover, the degree of local discretion is
too limited and insu¢ ciently sensitive to the magnitude of externalities. Hence, the
model shows that inadequate and excessively rigid federal interventions can emerge
from a neutral and democratic decision process without agency costs or informational
imperfections.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: H77, D72
Keywords: Federalism, Local Discretion, Directive, Partial Decentralization, Ma-
jority rule.1 Introduction
In its most simple formulation, federalism is about optimally allocating public respon-
sibilities between the local and federal levels in order to exploit their comparative ad-
vantages. Economic models typically derive conditions under which a policy domain
is better handled entirely at the local or at the central level. However, the function-
ing of actual federal systems does not ￿t this dichotomic description. Decision rights
are often shared by di⁄erent layers of governments. In the E.U., most state laws
are transpositions of European directives. These directives impose some constraints
but leave member states with a certain amount of leeway as to their implementation.
Likewise, the Stability and Growth Pact boils down to a set of bounds on states￿￿scal
policies. In the U.S., the Sentencing Reform Act imposes sentencing ranges on state
courts but grants them discretion within those ranges. In many countries, local taxes
are subject to minima and maxima set by the central level. These interventions es-
sentially de￿ne a discretionary space within which members keep residual sovereignty
and can set the policy that best ￿ts their speci￿c needs.
The presumed advantage of partially restricting local discretion through federal
constraints is that it allows to combine the comparative advantages of decentraliza-
tion (responsiveness to local circumstances) and centralization (policy coordination).
However, citizens and local policy makers often complain that federal directives are
insu¢ ciently sensitive to local needs and that the discretion devolved to the local
level is too limited, even when the gains from policy coordination are negligible. In
what follows, we shall refer to the former bias as the preferences-matching problem
and to the latter as the federal-encroachment problem. From a public choice perspec-
tive, the usual suspects for these ine¢ ciencies are the vested interests or the lack of
information of federal bureaucrats. This has led some observers to conclude that a
more democratic, bottom-up decision process could remedy these biases.
To investigate this claim, we analyze a model in which voters choose directly by
majority rule the orientation and ￿ exibility of the federal directives. The federation is
1composed of a ￿nite number of jurisdictions which we call states for concreteness. In
each state, a unidimensional policy has to be implemented. Voters have heterogeneous
preferences but also care about the harmonization of policies across states. The
federal intervention consists in imposing an interval [L;R] within which states can
choose the policies that best meet the needs of their constituents. This class of
federal interventions encompasses complete decentralization (if [L;R] include the ideal
policies of every state) and unitarian centralization (if L = R). The size of the
interval jR ￿ Lj allows for di⁄erent degrees of local discretion while a size-preserving
translation of the interval allows for di⁄erent policy orientations.
Citizens ￿rst vote at the federal level on the discretionary interval [L;R] and
then vote at the state level on their respective policies. Since we rule out institu-
tional or informational imperfections, this federal intervention boils down to a simple
preferences-aggregation mechanism. Hence, this model provides a transparent frame-
work for investigating whether majoritarian decision making at the federal level leads
to a satisfactory trade-o⁄ between coordination and ￿ exibility.
We ￿rst analyze a voting game in which citizens vote separately on the left bound
(L) and the right bound (R) of the discretionary interval. We show that irrespective
of the voting sequence, the only voting equilibrium entails L = R, and the federal
intervention is equivalent to complete centralization. The reason is that the vote on
each bound opposes leftist and rightist voters,1 so the median voters are pivotal at
both stages and can thus impose their most preferred policy across the federation.
To avoid the tyranny of the median voters, we consider an￿ arguably more sensible￿
alternative voting game which generates di⁄erent coalition structures at each voting
round: citizens vote ￿rst on the size of the interval ￿ =
jR￿Lj
2 (the degree of local
discretion) and then on its location ￿ = L+R
2 (the policy orientation). The ￿rst stage
1In this paper, rightist and leftist voters are de￿ned as voters whose ideal policy is to the right
and the left, respectively, of the ideal policy of the median voter. This distinction do not necessarily
corresponds to the liberal and conservative categories.
2can be interpreted as a constitutional referendum on the degree of decentralization
while the second stage can be interpreted as a vote on the federal directive, i.e., a
guideline from which states should not depart by more than ￿. The vote on the
degree of decentralization pits moderate versus extreme voters while the vote on the
federal directive opposes rightist and leftist voters.
For this voting game, the main results are the following: ￿rst, consistent with
the aforementioned preferences-matching problem, the equilibrium federal directive
￿ varies negatively with the preferences of nonmedian states. The magnitude of
this bias depends on the skewness of the preference distribution: when the prefer-
ence distribution is su¢ ciently skewed, the federal intervention is socially detrimental
irrespective of the magnitude of externalities. Second, consistent with the aforemen-
tioned federal-encroachment problem, when the magnitude of externalities is small,
the equilibrium degree of discretion ￿ is too limited: the federal intervention is so-
cially detrimental and leaves a majority of voters worse o⁄ than they would have
been without the federal intervention. Third, when externalities are more severe, the
federal intervention always receives the support of a majority of voters but its wel-
fare e⁄ect depends on the polarization of preferences: when preferences are not too
polarized, state discretion is still too limited and the federal intervention is socially
detrimental. Conversely, when preferences are su¢ ciently polarized, state discretion
is too broad but the federal intervention is Pareto improving.
These results show that rigid and inadequate federal directives, traditionally
blamed on dysfunctional federal institutions or the neglect of local speci￿cities by
federal bureaucrats, can also emerge from a neutral and democratic decision process.
One reason is that moderate voters have an incentive to impose most of the harmo-
nization e⁄ort on the states that need the most ￿ exibility: by doing so, they maximize
policy coordination across the federation without restricting their own sovereignty.
However, this problem goes beyond the usual tyranny of the majority (of moder-
ate voters) on the minorities (of extreme voters) because the federal intervention can
3make a majority of voters worse o⁄. The reason is that the vote on the degree of dis-
cretion and the vote on the federal directive are driven by two di⁄erent sets of pivotal
voters with con￿ icting incentives. It turns out that this equilibrium feature further
reduces local discretion in equilibrium. To see why, observe that the proponents of
coordination (moderate voters pushing for a smaller ￿) have more homogeneous pref-
erences than the proponents of local discretion (extreme right and extreme left voters
pushing for a greater ￿). Indeed, the latter have diametrically opposite preferences
when voting on ￿ at the second stage. This lack of cohesion makes their induced
preferences on ￿ at the ￿rst stage less congruent than those of the proponents of co-
ordination. Hence, our model formalizes the idea that in a federation composed of a
homogeneous group of ￿core￿states and a group of ￿peripheral￿states with di⁄erent
centrifugal motives, the latter have di¢ culties forming a cohesive opposition to the
centripetal in￿ uence of the former.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Sec-
tion 3 lays out the model. Section 4 analyzes the case in which voters vote on each
bound separately. Section 5 analyzes the case in which voters vote on the degree
of discretion and on the federal guideline. Section 6 contains the welfare analysis.
Section 7 illustrates our results in the case of a federation of three states and section
8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Since the seminal work of Oates (1972), a large normative literature has analyzed the
costs and bene￿ts of complete centralization and decentralization.2 We depart from
it in two respects: decision rights are shared between the local and the central levels
and the degree of decentralization is decided by a popular vote.
2See, e.g., Oates (1999) or Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a review, and Seabright (1996), Lock-
wood (2002), or Besley and Coate (2003) for a more political-economy approach.
4A number of papers have analyzed federal systems in which ￿scal responsibilities
are shared between the local and the central level.3 Most closely related to ours are the
voting models of federal mandates (Kanbur and Keen 1993, CrØmer and Palfrey 2000,
2006, and Monheim-Helstro⁄er and Obidzinski 2010) and of dual provision of public
goods (Epple and Romano 2003, Hafer and Landa 2007, Lulfesman 2008). Since these
papers consider free-riding rather than harmonization issues, the federal intervention
takes the form of a unidirectional constraint. For this reason, the con￿ icts of interest
between voters at the federal level have a di⁄erent ￿ avor. However, the federal-
encroachment phenomenon is reminiscent of the ￿delimitation problem￿highlighted
by CrØmer and Palfrey (2000)
Janeba (2006) considers a model of ideological externalities in which federalism is
modelled as an interval of discretion (see his section 4.5). Because he considers only
two types of voters, the voting equilibrium always entails complete uniformity.
CrØmer and Palfrey (1996, 1999) propose a model in which, as in ours, voting on
the architecture of the federation pits moderate versus extreme voters. Preferences
for centralization stem from the voters￿uncertainty about the location of the local
and federal median voter rather than externalities. To allow for various degrees of
centralization, they assume that the policy in each district is a weighted sum of the
ideal policy of the representative voter at the federal and at the local level.
Hat￿eld and Padro-i-Miquel (2008) endogenize the architecture of a federation
through a vote on the vertical allocation of public-good provision. They show that
an intermediate degree of decentralization allows the capital-poor median voter to
commit not to tax capital too heavily.
Finally, the literature on direct democracy has shown that referenda and public
initiatives can increase the risk that the majority oppresses minority groups (Gamble
1997, Eule 1998). This model shows further that federal interventions governed by
direct democracy may actually make a majority of voters worse o⁄. Redoano and
3See, e.g., Schwager (1999), Wilson and Janeba (2005), Brueckner (2009), or Joanis (2009).
5Scharf (2004) have shown that political integration is more likely under representative
democracy because strategic delegation allows voters to commit to a small federal
government (see also Feld et al. 2008).
3 The Model




and med(x) denotes its median coordinate. For all n 2 f1;::;Ng and xo 2 R, (xo;x￿n)
denotes the vector x in which the nth coordinate has been replaced by xo.
3.1 The Federation
We consider a federation composed of an odd number N of jurisdictions that we call
states for concreteness. For all n 2 f1;::;Ng, the policy of state n is denoted by xn
and the welfare of its residents is given by:








The ￿rst term in (1) corresponds to the intrinsic preferences of state n, i.e., whether
its policy xn meets the speci￿c needs ￿n of its constituents. The pro￿le of state types
￿ 2 RN allows for heterogeneity across states. For simplicity, we rule out hetero-
geneity within state.4 The second term captures the gains from policy coordination.
Depending on the policy considered, it can embody the legal uncertainty, litigation
costs, or sense of unfairness generated by heterogeneous laws; the transaction costs
and barriers to trade caused by a fragmented regulatory system; the ￿xed-cost dupli-
cation due to the lack of standardization of public services; or the barriers to mobility
4Intrastate preferences heterogneity would not change the results of the paper if we assume that
votes are aggregated at the federal level through the ￿one state one vote￿ rule, i.e., if votes are
aggregated ￿rst at the state level via intrastate majority rule and then at the federal level via
interstate majority rule (see, e.g., CrØmer and Palfrey 1996). The median voter in each state would
simply become its representative voter.
6generated by incompatible school curricula.5 The parameter ￿ > 0 determines the
magnitude of these externalities. For welfare comparison, we use the usual utilitarian
social welfare function W =
P
n Un.
By convention, ￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ￿N, and ￿ = N+1
2 refers to the state with median pref-
erences. The states n such that ￿n < ￿￿ (￿n > ￿￿) are called leftist (rightist) states,
although the type space should not necessarily be interpreted as a liberal/conservative
ideological spectrum. We assume that no majority of voters have the same type so
all voters agree that some degree of harmonization is desirable but no majority agree
on the direction of harmonization.
Finally, a remark is in order about the setting of the model. We depart from the
standard case of positive or negative spillovers and consider instead coordination ex-
ternalities, i.e., externalities that are driven by the di⁄erences and incompatibilities
between local policies (as in Garoupa and Ogus 2006, Carbonara and Parisi 2007,
Baniak and Grazl 2009, or Loeper 2010), for three reasons. First, coordination exter-
nalities are at the center of many economically relevant issues in federal systems (e.g.,
legal and regulatory harmonization, labor mobility, and standardization of technical
norms). Second, the case of spillovers has already received some attention in the fed-
eralism literature.6 Finally, with either positive or negative externalities, the con￿ ict
of interest at the federal level typically pits low- versus high-demand voters.7 This
unidirectional con￿ ict fails to capture a fundamental aspect of federalism: the voters
who push for more centralization are usually more homogeneous than the voters who
5On the cost of legal and regulatory heterogeneity, see, e.g., Ribstein and Kobayashi (1996), Kox
et al (2005) for an empirical analysis of the cost of regulatory fragmentation, and Marciano and
Josselin (2002) for an edited volume of contributions on the topic. See Loeper (2010) for more
references on the cost of policy heterogeneity in federal systems.
6See the references in section 2.
7It should be noted that in the case of joint provision of the public good (as opposed to unfunded
federal mandates), if the federal provision is ￿nanced by progressive taxation, rich voters will also
be larger contributor. In this case, coalitions of poor and rich voters versus moderate income voters
might emerge in equilibrium. See Epple and Romano (2003) and Hafer and Landa (2008).
7push for more decentralization, the reason being that the centrifugal pressures of the
latter group have typically diverse motives.8
On the contrary, in this model, as we will see, the voters who prefer more coordi-
nation are residents of core states (loosely de￿ned as states whose type is relatively
close to ￿￿) while the voters who prefer more local discretion are residents of peripheral
states (loosely de￿ned as states whose type is relatively distant from ￿￿).
3.2 Centralization and Decentralization
Under decentralization, each state has complete sovereignty on its policy and max-
imizes the welfare of its constituents, taking the other policies as given. The corre-
sponding equilibrium xdec is given by






One can easily show that xdec is Pareto ine¢ cient whenever states￿types are not
uniform: voters do not internalize interstate externalities and choose policies which
are too heterogeneous. For instance, the policy x￿ which maximizes W is given by






which is a mean-preserving contraction of xdec. Hence, a federal intervention could
improve on decentralization by imposing some degree of coordination.
Typically, decentralization is compared to a centralized regime in which a uniform
policy vector is chosen by federation-wide majority rule. Since induced preferences
on uniform policies are single-peaked, the centralized voting equilibrium is
x
c = (￿￿;:::;￿￿): (4)
8The case of Europe and its various international treaties illustrate this point nicely. The coun-
tries pushing for more political integration are typically rich social democracies which share a long
common history (France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands) while the countries oppos-
ing further political integration or refusing to adopt the Euro or to join the E.U. include countries
as diverse as the U.K., ex-soviet satellites, Sweden, and Switzerland.
83.3 The Federal Coordination Mechanism
In this simple setup, as shown in Loeper (2010), unitarian centralization is never
socially better than decentralization. The present paper analyzes a more ￿ exible
coordination mechanism which limits states￿policy to an interval [L;R] within which
states have residual control. Citizens ￿rst vote at the federal level on the discretionary
interval￿ the details of the voting scheme will be speci￿ed in the following sections￿
and then vote at the state level on their respective policy within the federal bounds
[L;R]. This class of federal mechanism can accommodate di⁄erent degrees of local
discretion (via the range of the interval) and di⁄erent policy orientations (via the
location of the interval on the preferences spectrum).
Modeling the federal intervention as a discretionary interval captures the idea
of a federal mechanism which coordinates the states by imposing broad constraints
rather than micromanaging their policies. This model does not attempt to describe
any real-world institution in detail. Instead, its main goal is to provide a tractable
framework for analyzing how democratic forces trade o⁄ the need for coordination
and for ￿ exibility.
This type of federal intervention is, however, inspired by existing institutions.
For instance, the European Commission leaves member states some leeway in the
transposition and implementation of European directives, and often specify an interval
of time for implementation.9 In the U.S., the Sentencing Reform Act provides a grid
of sentencing ranges for ￿nes and jail times for each o⁄ense category. Its goal is to
￿provide certainty and fairness￿while ￿avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities￿
and ￿maintaining su¢ cient ￿ exibility￿ .10 Likewise, several nations have a core school
curriculum specifying a set of goals for student achievement but granting some degree
9Article 249 of the Treaty establishing the European Community: ￿A directive shall be binding,
as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to
the national authorities the choice of form and methods.￿
10U.S. Code, Chapter 58, section 991 : United States Sentencing Commission; establishment and
purposes.
9of discretion to localities and schools as to organization of course system, hiring
and training of teachers, choice of the textbooks, and the like. In Germany, the
supreme court￿ s decision in 2003 gives some discretion to the L￿nder on the regulation
of religious signs in public schools (see Janeba 2006). In taxation, many central
governments impose lower and upper bounds on the tax rates set by subnational
governments.11
3.4 The State Equilibrium
We ￿rst characterize the equilibrium policies at the state level once the federal bounds
have been set. A state equilibrium is a policy vector x such that for all n, xn maximizes
the welfare of the voters of state n on [L;R] taking x￿n as given.
Proposition 1 For all L ￿ R, there is a unique state equilibrium denoted by x(L;R).
It is characterized by the number l(L;R) and r(L;R) of states constrained by the left
and right bound, respectively:












4 Voting on the Federal Bounds
At the federal level, a natural way to aggregate votes on the discretionary space [L;R]
is to vote separately on each bound. For instance, if the federation votes ￿rst on L
and then on R, the voting game is as follows:
11Revelli (2010) documents the e⁄ect of federal minima and maxima on vehicle registration tax,
electricity taxation, and waste management surcharge in Italy. See Joumard and Kongsrud (2003)
for further discussion on this issue.
101. The federation votes on the left bound L,
2. The federation votes on the right bound R,
3. Each state votes on its respective policy within [L;R].
The game is solved by backward induction, and votes are aggregated at the federal
level by simple majority rule (henceforth SMR). At the third stage, for any (L;R),
the subgame equilibrium is the state equilibrium x(L;R) characterized in proposition
1. At the second stage, for any ￿rst-stage outcome L, Re 2 [L;+1[ is a subgame
equilibrium if for all R ￿ L, x(L;R) is not preferred by SMR to x(L;Re). Finally, a
federal equilibrium is a pair (Le;Re) such that Re is a subgame equilibrium following
Le, and for any L and R such that R is a subgame equilibrium following L, x(L;R) is
not preferred by SMR to x(Le;Re). It turns out that this issue-by-issue decomposition
is equivalent to complete centralization.
Proposition 2 If L and R are voted upon sequentially in any order or simultane-
ously,12 the unique equilibrium is given by L = R = ￿￿.
Observe that the equilibrium entails complete uniformity irrespective of the sever-
ity of externalities, and the uniform policy is independent of nonmedian preferences.
This two features can be viewed as a form of federal encroachment and preference
matching, respectively. The intuition behind proposition 2 is that both voting stages
oppose rightist to leftist voters. This makes the voters of the median state pivotal at
both stages and allows them to secure their most preferred policy vector.
However, complete rigidity is not an inevitable consequence of majoritarian decision-
making. As there is no Condorcet winner on F = f(L;R) 2 R2 : L ￿ Rg, the outcome
of a sequential voting mechanism depends on how the space of alternative F is divided
12By simultaneously, we mean that L and R are voted upon simultaneously but separately as
in Schepsle (1979): an equilibrium is a pair (Le;Re) such that for all L ￿ Re, x(L;Re) is not
SMR-preferred to x(Le;Re), and for all R ￿ Le, x(Le;R) is not SMR-preferred to x(Le;Re).
11into issues, i.e., how the referendum questions are framed. For this reason, the next
section analyzes a di⁄erent issue-by-issue decomposition.13
5 Voting on Directives and Local Discretion
In order to avoid the tyranny of the median voters and obtain a more ￿ exible outcome,
the preceding result suggests a referendum design that induces di⁄erent coalitional
structures, and thus di⁄erent pivotal voters, at each voting stage. For this reason, we
consider a natural alternative to the previous voting sequence:
1. The federation votes on the size of the discretionary interval ￿ = R￿L
2 ,
2. The federation votes on the location of the discretionary interval ￿ = L+R
2 ,
3. Each state votes on its respective policy within [￿ ￿ ￿;￿ + ￿].
As we will see, the ￿rst stage will oppose coalitions of extreme versus moderate
voters, while at the second stage, leftist and rightist coalitions will emerge. Each
stage has a meaningful interpretation: the ￿rst stage can be viewed as a constitutional
referendum on the degree of decentralization.14 The second stage can be interpreted
as a popular vote on the federal directive, a guideline from which states should not
depart by more than ￿. The timing of the voting game re￿ ects the fact that the
degree of local discretion implied by the constitution is more resistant to change than
the federal directive.
For notational convenience, for any function f of (L;R), we will write f (￿;￿) as
a shortcut for f (￿ ￿ ￿;￿ + ￿). The game is solved by backward induction: at the
13Kramer (1972) and Schepsle (1979) ￿rst argued that the details of the institutional rules used to
aggregate votes may in￿ uence the outcome of the voting game. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) made
a similar point to ours in the case of a vote on a two-dimensional budget.
14The degree of coordination that a federal administration can impose can be interpreted more
broadly as the institutional features that determine its strength, such as the e¢ cacy of its coercive
levers on member states or its ￿nancial and legal resources.
12third stage, for all (￿;￿), the subgame equilibrium is the state equilibrium x(￿;￿)
de￿ned in proposition 1. At the second stage, for any ￿ ￿ 0, the set of subgame
equilibria ￿(￿) is the set of ￿ such that for all ￿0, x(￿0;￿) is not preferred by SMR
to x(￿;￿). A federal equilibrium is a pair (￿e;￿e) such that ￿e 2 ￿(￿e) and for all
￿ ￿ 0 and all ￿ 2 ￿(￿), x(￿;￿) is not preferred by SMR to x(￿e;￿e).
5.1 Federal Directives
The state equilibrium de￿nes an induced utility function Vn (￿;￿) for each state
n. Note that for a given ￿, l(￿;￿) and r(￿;￿) as de￿ned in proposition 1 have
discontinuous jumps in ￿, and this induces a kink in Vn (￿;￿), so Vn (￿;￿) may have
multiple peaks in ￿. Nevertheless, a Condorcet winner always exists at the second
stage.
Proposition 3 For all ￿ ￿ 0, the second-stage equilibria ￿(￿) are the most pre-
ferred ￿ of the voters of the median state. For all ￿ 2 ￿(￿), the policy of the median
state is unconstrained, i.e., l(￿;￿) < ￿ < r(￿;￿), and




Proposition 3 suggests that, in equilibrium, the federal directive is not positively
responsive to the preferences of peripheral states. Indeed, the farther from ￿￿ the
types of the rightist states are, relative to the types of the leftist states, the greater r
relative to l, so, from (5), the more leftist the federal directive. The intuition for this
bias is the following: when choosing the federal directive, the voters of the median
state dictate which states will be constrained or unconstrained by the federal bounds.
This has two consequences. First, they will vote for a directive which lets them choose
the policy they prefer. Roughly speaking, this motive corresponds to the term ￿￿ in
(5). Second, conditional on being unconstrained by the federal bounds, their most
preferred directive is the one that minimizes policy heterogeneity. For this reason,
13they will choose a ￿ which constrains the most extreme states. This motive explains
the term l￿r
l+r￿ in (5).
By imposing most of the harmonization e⁄ort on the states that need the most
￿ exibility, the voters of the median state maximize policy coordination without re-
stricting their discretion, more so than under the same nominal degree of local dis-
cretion ￿ but with a socially optimal federal guideline ￿￿. Indeed, ￿￿ is increasing in
the type of constrained states and thus leans towards the most extreme side of the
preferences distribution.15 As the next proposition shows, the equilibrium directive
does exactly the opposite.
De￿nition 1 A distribution of type ￿ is skewed to the right (left) if for all n 6= ￿,
￿n+￿2￿￿n
2 > ￿￿ (
￿n+￿2￿￿n
2 < ￿￿).
Proposition 4 The correspondence ￿(￿) is weakly decreasing in nonmedian types
for the strong set order ￿:16 for all ￿;￿
0 such that ￿￿ = ￿
0






Moreover, if ￿ is skewed to the right (left), then for all ￿ 2 ￿(￿), ￿ ￿ ￿￿ (￿ ￿ ￿￿).
In words, a distribution of preferences is skewed to the right if rightist states are
more extreme than leftist states. In this case, the median voters will bias the directive
towards the moderate (i.e., left) side of the preferences spectrum so as to reduce the
leeway of the most extreme (i.e., rightist) states and force their policies to be more
aligned with their own preferences. Hence, proposition 4 shows that the preference-
matching problem mentioned in the introduction can emerge in a neutral and open
democratic decision process without institutional imperfections.











(x(￿￿;￿)). We show in the appendix (lemma 2) that @Un
@￿n is increasing in ￿. Therefore,
from Topkis theorem, ￿￿ must be increasing in ￿n.
16For all X;Y ￿ R, X ￿ Y if for all (x;y) 2 (X;Y ), max(x;y) 2 X and min(x;y) 2 Y .
14The next proposition shows further that when preferences are su¢ ciently skewed,
this bias can make the federal intervention socially detrimental irrespective of the
magnitude of externalities and the degree of local discretion.
Proposition 5 If the preference distribution is su¢ ciently skewed, i.e., if j￿n ￿ ￿￿j ￿
j￿m ￿ ￿￿j for all n > ￿ > m or for all n < ￿ < m, then for all ￿ ￿ 0 and all
￿ 2 ￿(￿), x(￿;￿) is socially worse than decentralization.
This result contrasts with the literature on ￿scal federalism which argues that the
welfare e⁄ect of centralization hinges on the heterogeneity of local preferences and
the magnitude of externalities.
5.2 State Discretion
Let us now consider the ￿rst stage of the voting game. Notice that as ￿ varies, the
number of left- and right-constrained states l and r changes, and (5) implies that
￿(￿) jumps discontinuously, possibly nonmonotonically in ￿. As a consequence,
induced preferences on ￿ are neither single-peaked, nor order-restricted, nor contin-
uous, so a Condorcet winner may not exist at the ￿rst stage.17 In section 7, we show
that a federal equilibrium always exists in the speci￿c case of three states. In the
general case, we restrict our attention to local majority rule equilibria as introduced
by Kramer and Klevorick (1973).
De￿nition 2 (￿e;￿e) is a local federal equilibrium (henceforth LFE) if ￿e 2 ￿(￿e),
if there exists a neighborhood N of ￿e such that XN = fx(￿;￿) : ￿ 2 N;￿ 2 ￿(￿)g
is not a singleton and if for all x 2 XN, x is not preferred by SMR to x(￿e;￿e).18
17Denzau and Mackay (1981) and Cremer and Palfrey (2006) provide examples of nonexistence of
a voting equilibrium in a similar setup.
18The requirement that XN is not a singleton rules out trivial equilibria in which the policies are
locally constant on both sides of ￿, which could arise if ￿ is su¢ ciently large.
15Since this equilibrium concept considers only local deviations, it is more permissive
than the standard Condorcet winner requirement, and equilibrium multiplicity might
be a problem. Fortunately, we will see that for our purpose, the concept is su¢ ciently
discriminating to derive clear welfare results.
Proposition 6 A LFE exists.19 At any LFE (￿e;￿e), ￿e > 0 and at least a majority
of states are constrained: l(￿e;￿e) + r(￿e;￿e) ￿ N+1
2 :
Hence, opposing moderate to extreme voters at the ￿rst stage guarantees that the
equilibrium degree of local discretion is positive, and that the voters of the median
state cannot impose their most preferred policy. To see why a majority of states must
be constrained at any LFE, it is helpful to notice the following: If ￿(￿) is single-
valued and continuous on some interval I, we show in the appendix (see lemma 4)
that for all ￿ 2 I,












Thus, as the degree of local discretion decreases, the policies of the unconstrained
states are una⁄ected by ￿, and the harmonization e⁄orts are borne entirely by the
constrained states. For this reason, the unconstrained states unanimously prefer less
local discretion. As long as they are a majority, they will form a winning coalition of
free riders pushing for less local discretion.
19Observe that since induced preferences are not continuous, we cannot resort to the existence
theorem of Kramer and Klevorick (1973).
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6.1 Small Externalities
Proposition 6 implies that in equilibrium, the pivotal voters are necessarily from a
state constrained by the federal bounds. When voting on ￿, they internalize neither
the bene￿ts of harmonization for the unconstrained states nor the bene￿ts of ￿ exibility
for the other constrained states. For small coordination costs, the former is negligible
compared to the latter, so the pivotal voters, together with the voters of unconstrained
states, have an incentive to excessively constrict the leeway of peripheral states to
secure negligible coordination gains. The next proposition con￿rms this intuition.
Proposition 7 For all ￿, there exists ￿ > 0 such that for all ￿ < ￿,
a) any LFE is socially worse than decentralization and makes a majority of voters
worse o⁄.
b) for any LFE (￿e;￿e), ￿xing ￿ = ￿e, the welfare of a majority of voters is
strictly increasing in ￿ around ￿e.
However, proposition 7 part a) suggests that the above intuition￿ a majority of
moderate voters restricting the leeway of a minority of extreme voters￿ is not the
only cause of the excessive rigidity of the federal intervention. Indeed, this intuition
cannot explain why￿ contrary to CrØmer and Palfrey (2000), Hafer and Landa (2007),
or Lulfesman (2008)￿ the federal intervention makes a majority of voters worse o⁄.
That result is somewhat counter-intuitive since the class of federal interventions
we consider encompasses decentralization and all decisions are taken by majority rule.
The reason is that the pivotal voter at the ￿rst stage is not the median voter as in
the second stage, and since the two types of pivotal voters have con￿ icting incentives,
their choices may leave a majority of voters worse o⁄.
To understand why having two di⁄erent pivotal voters further restricts local dis-
cretion, notice that the pivotal voters at the ￿rst stage take into account not only
17the direct e⁄ect of ￿ on the trade-o⁄between policy coordination and ￿ exibility, but
also the strategic e⁄ect of ￿ on the second-stage equilibrium, i.e., its e⁄ect on the
incentives of the median state when voting on ￿. With respect to the direct e⁄ect,
peripheral states unanimously prefer more discretion. With respect to the strategic
e⁄ect, their interests collide since at the second stage, rightist and leftist states have
diametrically opposing preferences. To ￿x ideas, suppose that, locally, ￿(￿) is lean-
ing to the left as ￿ decreases. In this case, the leftist voters will strategically vote
for less discretion. Together with the voters from core states￿ who always prefer less
discretion￿ they will form a majority pushing for more coordination. In words, the
heterogeneity of peripheral states makes their incentives at the ￿rst voting stage less
aligned than that of core states, so the former cannot form a cohesive opposition to
the centripetal in￿ uence of the latter.
6.2 Large Externalities
When the magnitude of externalities increases, the coordination gains from the federal
intervention might counterbalance its ine¢ ciencies so its welfare e⁄ect is ambiguous
and depends on the preferences distribution. We already know from proposition 5
that the federal intervention is socially detrimental when the preference distribution
is su¢ ciently skewed. In what follows, we analyze the opposite case of symmetric
preference distribution, i.e., for all n,
￿2￿￿n+￿n
2 = ￿￿. We show in the appendix that in
this case, at any LFE (￿e;￿e), ￿(￿e) = f￿￿g, which is the socially optimal directive
for any ￿ ￿ 0. Since the second-stage equilibrium is optimal, we can focus on the
￿rst-stage vote. As we will see, the main determinant of the equilibrium degree of
decentralization is then the polarization of preferences:
De￿nition 3 The degree of polarization ￿ (￿) of a preference distribution ￿ is
￿ (￿) =




n j￿n ￿ ￿￿j
: (7)











, ￿n = ￿￿ + ￿ and ￿n = ￿￿ otherwise.20;21
Roughly speaking, a preference distribution is polarized if it comprises a homo-
geneous group of rightist states and a homogenous group of leftist states at similar
distances from the median type, and these two groups command a majority which
can oppose the centripetal in￿ uence of moderate voters.22
Proposition 8 Let ￿ be a symmetric preference distribution, (￿e;￿e) be a LFE, and
￿￿ be the socially optimal degree of local discretion given ￿ = ￿￿.
a) If ￿ (￿) ￿
1+ 3
2￿
1+2￿ , then ￿e < ￿￿.
b) If ￿ is maximally polarized and N > 3, then there exists ￿ such that for all
￿ ￿ ￿, ￿e > ￿￿.
c) For all ￿, there exists ￿ such that if ￿ (￿) < ￿, any LFE is socially worse but
majority preferred to decentralization.
d) If ￿ is maximally polarized, then there exists ￿ such that for all ￿ ￿ ￿, any LFE
Pareto dominates decentralization.
Part a) implies that if ￿ (￿) < 3
4, then for all ￿, the equilibrium degree of lo-
cal discretion is too small:23 a low degree of polarization exacerbates the federal-




denotes the smallest integer weakly greater than N+1
4 .
21One can show that a maximally polarized preferences pro￿le indeed maximizes ￿ (￿) among
symmetric pro￿les of type, and is a global maximizer when N+1
4 is an integer.
22Notice that the notion of polarization is orthogonal to the notion of heterogeneity since ￿ (￿)
is invariant by a¢ ne transformation of ￿. See Esteban and Ray (1994) for a related notion of
polarization.
23To see this, notice that for all ￿ ￿ 0,
1+3=2￿
1+2￿ > 3=4. To see what ￿ (￿) < 3=4 means, notice that
if each ￿n is i.i.d., normally distributed, then as N ! 1, ￿ (￿) ! 0:84, while if they are chi-square
distributed on each side of their mean, ￿ (￿) ! 0:46.
19ciently polarized and externalities are su¢ ciently large, the equilibrium entails an
ine¢ ciently low degree of policy harmonization.
Comparing proposition 8 part b) with proposition 7, we see that when preferences
are polarized, the equilibrium degree of decentralization ￿e is insu¢ ciently sensitive to
the magnitude of externalities: the federal intervention entails too much coordination
when the gains from coordination are small and too little coordination when it is
crucial.
Part c) and d) show that when the gains from coordination are large, the federal
intervention receives the support of majority of voters, but it is not necessarily socially
bene￿cial. Observe that contrary to the common wisdom, the federal intervention can
be socially detrimental even when externalities are arbitrarilly large and preferences
are homogeneous.
Combining propositions 5 and 8, we see that skewness exacerbates the perverse in-
centive of the median voters at the second stage￿ the preferences-matching problem￿
while polarization counterbalances the centripetal pressures of moderate voters at the
￿rst stage￿ the federal-encroachment problem. Hence, unless the distribution of pref-
erences is su¢ ciently symmetric and polarized and externalities are su¢ ciently large,
even a perfectly democratic federal system can be excessively rigid and poorly re-
sponsive to local preferences.
7 Triadic Federations
In this section, we illustrate our results in the case of a federation composed of three
homogeneous groups of leftist, moderate, and rightist states. Formally, a preference
pro￿le is triadic when
￿1 = :: = ￿￿ < ￿￿+1 = :: = ￿￿ = :: = ￿N￿￿ < ￿N￿￿+1 = :: = ￿N;







such that ￿ + ￿ > N+1
2 . The latter condition means
that no single group commands a majority but any coalition of two groups does.
20Proposition 9 If ￿ is triadic, the unique LFE (￿e;￿e) is a (global) federal equilib-











































The intuition behind proposition 7 is the following. Do
￿ and Do
￿ are the degrees
of local discretion below which leftist and rightist states are constrained, respec-






cannot be a LFE because at ￿, the
voters of unconstrained states form a majority pushing for less discretion. D￿ and
D￿ are the ideal degrees of discretion of the citizens of leftist and rightist states, re-
spectively, conditional on both being constrained by the federal bounds. Therefore,
￿ > minfD￿;D￿g cannot be a LFE because the voters of median-type states always
prefer a lower ￿ and either rightist or leftist states are constrained but their voters






, both rightist and left-
ist states are constrained and their voters prefer more discretion. Therefore, the only







When ￿ is su¢ ciently small, we know from proposition 7 that the federal interven-
tion excessively restricts local discretion. In the case of a triadic federation with ￿ = ￿,
the rigidity of the federal intervention takes the following form: As ￿ ! 0, Do
￿ < D￿
and Do























minf￿￿ ￿ ￿1;￿N ￿ ￿￿g;




￿ = maxf￿￿ ￿ ￿1;￿N ￿ ￿￿g:
By comparing the two expressions above, we see that the excessive rigidity of the
federal intervention is increasing in the skewness of the preference distribution.
21When ￿ is su¢ ciently large, proposition 8 shows that the federal intervention
can be Pareto improving. In the case of a triadic federation, it can even be Pareto
optimal. To see this, observe that for ￿ su¢ ciently large, Do
￿ > D￿ and Do
￿ > D￿
so ￿e = minfD￿;D￿g. If we assume further that the preference distribution is
symmetric, i.e., j￿￿ ￿ ￿1j = j￿N ￿ ￿￿j and ￿ = ￿, then D￿ = D￿. In this case,
both rightist and leftist states are pivotal at the ￿rst stage. Since the second-stage
equilibrium ￿e = ￿￿ is optimal, the equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal.
The next proposition characterizes the welfare e⁄ect of the federal intervention
when ￿ 6= ￿ or j￿￿ ￿ ￿1j 6= j￿N ￿ ￿￿j.
Proposition 10 For ￿ su¢ ciently large,
a) if j￿￿ ￿ ￿1j = j￿N ￿ ￿￿j and ￿ = ￿, the federal equilibrium Pareto dominates
decentralization and is Pareto optimal, while if ￿j￿￿ ￿ ￿1j 6= ￿j￿N ￿ ￿￿j, some
states strictly prefer decentralization,
b) if j￿￿ ￿ ￿1j = j￿N ￿ ￿￿j and ￿ 6= ￿, the federal equilibrium is socially better than
decentralization,
c) if ￿ = ￿ and j￿￿ ￿ ￿1j 6= j￿N ￿ ￿￿j, decentralization is socially better than the
federal equilibrium,
d) for all preference pro￿les, the federal equilibrium is majority preferred to decen-
tralization.
The intuition behind part a) and b) is the following: if j￿￿ ￿ ￿1j = j￿N ￿ ￿￿j,
rightist and leftist voters trade o⁄ policy coordination and ￿ exibility in a similar
manner. This mitigates the gap between the private cost and the social cost of the
pivotal voters, and the federal intervention is socially bene￿cial. Parts c) and d) are
in line with proposition 8: the federal intervention always receive a majority support
independently of its welfare e⁄ect.
228 Conclusion
This paper considers a class of federal coordination mechanisms that impose some
degree of harmonization while granting states some degree of sovereignty. We inves-
tigate whether a neutral and democratic decision process at the federal level can lead
to a satisfactory trade-o⁄ between ￿ exibility and policy coordination. To do so, we
let citizens determine by federal majority rule the degree of discretion granted to the
states and the policy orientation of the federal intervention.
We show that in equilibrium, the policy orientation of the federal directive is neg-
atively responsive to voters￿preferences and the degree of local discretion is typically
too limited. The excessive rigidity of the federal intervention is due not only to the
usual problem of the majority (of moderate voters) enslaving the minority (of extreme
voters) but also to the fact that extreme voters are less homogenous than moderate
voters so the former cannot form a cohesive opposition to the centripetal in￿ uence of
the latter.
9 Appendix
Throughout, V dec denotes the pro￿le of welfare under decentralization. Lemma 1
proves proposition 1. Lemma 2 gives conditions under which SMR preferences on
fL;Rg aggregate transitively.
Lemma 1 For all ￿;￿, the state equilibrium x(L;R) characterized in proposition 1
is unique and xn (L;R) is weakly increasing in ￿;L;R and n. For any a¢ ne map











N + ￿ (l + r)
: (8)
Proof. The ￿rst-order condition of 1) immediately gives that a state equilibrium
x is a ￿xed point of the best-response function:









23Since f is a contraction for the sup norm on [L;R]
N, the state equilibrium exists and is
unique. From (9), xn (L;R) is weakly increasing in n. Since f is weakly increasing in
x and in (￿;L;R), Villas-Boas (1997, theorem 4) implies that its ￿xed point x(L;R)
is weakly increasing in (￿;L;R).
Observe that for all A;B ￿ N, the set of fL;Rg such that the constraint L ￿
￿n+￿x
1+￿
is binding for n 2 A and the constraint
￿n+￿x
1+￿ ￿ R is binding for n 2 B is a convex
subset of R2, since if x and x0 are solutions of (9) for (L;R) and (L0;R0), respectively,
then ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)x0 is solution of (9) for ￿(L;R) + (1 ￿ ￿)(L0;R0). The implicit
function theorem implies that x(L;R) is di⁄erentiable on the interior of these convex
sets, and since there is a ￿nite number of subsets A and B, for all a¢ ne maps L(:)
and R(:), x(L(￿);R(￿)) is piecewise a¢ ne in ￿. Di⁄erentiating (9) wrt L and R,




@R , we get (8).
Lemma 2 For all L ￿ L0;R ￿ R0, Vn(L0;R0)￿Vn(L;R) is weakly increasing in n. In
particular, SMR preferences between [L;R] and [L0;R0] coincide with the preferences
of the voters of the median state.
Proof. Observe that the induced utility function Vn(L;R) of state n can be
written as













for x = x(L;R) and tn = ￿n. Let y￿ (tn;x) be the maximizer of (10). From the
envelope theorem, for all tn 2 R, @Wn
@tn = 2(y￿ (tn;x) ￿ tn), so




￿ (t;x(L;R)) ￿ t)dt;













Observe that if W (tn;x;y) denotes the maximand of (10), for all m, @2W
@y@xm > 0.
Hence W is supermodular in (y;xm) and Topkis theorem implies that y￿ is weakly
24increasing in x. From lemma 1, if L0 ￿ L and R0 ￿ R then x(L0;R0) ￿ x(L;R), so
the integrand in (11) is non negative, which proves the ￿rst part of the lemma.
To prove the second part, notice that if the median voters strictly prefer (L0;R0)
to (L;R), so do the voters of the states n ￿ ￿.
Lemma 3 For all L ￿ R, the state equilibrium x(L;R) is equal to xdec (t) (see (2))






for all n with
t = (1 + ￿)L ￿ ￿x(L;R); (12)
t = (1 + ￿)R ￿ ￿x(L;R):













Proof. The map ￿ ! xdec (￿) de￿ned in (2) can be inverted as follows: ￿n =
(1 + ￿)xdec
n ￿￿xdec. Substituting xdec = x(L;R) in the previous expression and using
(9), we get the ￿as if￿pro￿le of type t.






where W is de￿ned in (10) with [L;R] = [￿1;￿N]. Using the envelope












































































= ￿n ￿ xdec
n , in (14), we get (13).
9.1 Proofs in Section 4
Proof of proposition 2. Suppose for concreteness that citizens vote ￿rst on L and
then on R. From lemma 2, the Condorcet winners at the second stage will be the
most preferred R of the median state. which exists by continuity of x(L;R).
25At the ￿rst stage, for any L ￿ ￿￿, one can easily see from (1) that the most
preferred L of the median state is L = R. Hence, from lemma 2, the median states
and all leftist states will prefer L = ￿￿ to any L > ￿￿ at the ￿rst stage.
Suppose now that L < ￿￿. We ￿rst show that in this case, the most preferred R
of the median state at the second stage will be such that L < R ￿ ￿￿. For all L;R
such that L < ￿￿ ￿ R, the median state is unconstrained at the state equilibrium





















































From (9), 0 ￿
@x(L;R)
@R ￿ 1 so from (12), for almost all R, @t
@R > 0 and
@t
@R < 0.
Therefore, if L < ￿￿, for almost all R ￿ ￿￿, @V￿=@R ￿ 0. Hence, given L < ￿￿, the
most preferred R of the median state is such that R ￿ ￿￿. Clearly, the median state
prefers L = R = ￿￿ to L ￿ R ￿ ￿￿, and from lemma 2, so do all rightist states.
In the simultaneous case, from lemma 3, the median voters are pivotal both on L
and R so for any (L;R) 6= (￿￿;￿￿), they can increase their payo⁄ by changing either
L or R.
9.2 Proofs in Subsection 5.1
Proof of proposition 3. Step 1: the voters of the median state are pivotal.
Since ￿ ￿ ￿ and ￿ + ￿ are increasing in ￿, lemma 2 implies that the majority
preferences on ￿ coincide with the preferences of the median state, so ￿(￿) are the
most preferred ￿ of the voters of the median state.
Step 2: at their most preferred ￿ of the voters of the median state, their policy is
unconstrained.
















































= 1 + ￿ ￿ ￿
(1 + ￿)(l + r)
N + ￿ (l + r)
=
(1 + ￿)N
N + ￿ (l + r)
: (16)






N (1 + ￿)
￿
l ￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)
@t
@￿





￿ [l ￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿) + r ￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)]
N + ￿ (l + r)
. (17)
From (17), for almost all such ￿,
@V￿
@￿ > 0 whenever ￿+￿ < ￿￿ and
@V￿
@￿ < 0 whenever
￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿￿. The same is true a fortiori when the median state is constrained by
the federal bounds.24 So the most preferred directive ￿￿ of the voters of the median
state is such that ￿￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿ ￿;￿￿ + ￿]. Since for all ￿, x(￿;￿) 2 [￿ ￿ ￿;￿ + ￿],
necessarily
￿￿+￿x(￿￿;￿)
1+￿ 2 [￿￿ ￿ ￿;￿￿ + ￿], so the median state is unconstrained.
Step 3: for all ￿ 2 ￿(￿), ￿ = ￿￿ + l￿r
l+r￿.
Observe that l(￿;￿) and r(￿;￿) are weakly increasing and decreasing, respectively.
So from (17), at any point ￿d of discontinuity of l or r,
@V￿
@￿ has an upward jump.
Hence, the kinks of V￿ are all convex kinks so V￿ is maximized at a di⁄erentiability
point. To conclude, observe that
@V￿
@￿ = 0 implies ￿ = ￿￿ + l￿r
l+r￿.
Proof of proposition 4. Step 1:
@V ￿
￿
@￿ is weakly decreasing in ￿n for all n 6= ￿
and for almost all ￿ such that at (￿;￿), the median state is unconstrained.
24For instance, if the constraint x￿ ￿ ￿+￿ is binding, then ￿+￿ < ￿￿ so (17) is positive. Using
the envelope theorem on the program (10) for x = x(￿;￿),
@V￿
@￿ is given by (17) plus the Lagrange
multiplier of the constraint x￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿, which is positive. Therefore,
@V￿
@￿ is positive.
27From (17), for all n 6= ￿,
@V ￿
￿




weakly decreasing in ￿n if (17) is decreasing in r and increasing in l. If we call A(l;r)
the right hand-side of (17),
A(l;r + 1) ￿ A(l;r) = ￿
N (￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ 2￿l￿
(N + ￿ (l + r))(N + ￿ (l + r + 1))
: (18)
For a ￿xed (￿;￿) and ￿￿￿, since l is decreasing in ￿￿, the numerator of (18) is
increasing in ￿￿. Let t￿ be the largest ￿￿ at which state ￿ is unconstrained. Since
the median state is unconstrained in equilibrium, from what precedes, to prove that
A(l;r) is weakly decreasing in r, it su¢ ces to prove that the numerator of (18) is
negative at ￿￿ = t￿. From (9), at ￿￿ = t￿, x￿ =
￿￿+￿x
1+￿ = ￿ + ￿, so
t￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ (￿ + ￿ ￿ x): (19)
Moreover, we always have that
x ￿
(N ￿ l) ￿ (￿ + ￿) + l ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
N
: (20)
Substituting (20) in (19), we get t￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 2￿ l￿
N , which shows that (18) is negative.
Similar algebra shows that A(l;r) is decreasing in l.
Step 2: ￿
￿ (￿) is weakly decreasing in ￿n in the strong set order sense for n 6= ￿.
This follows directly from step 1, Topkis theorem and proposition 3.




2 for all n.
Step 3: if there exists G 2 ￿
t (￿) such that G > t￿, then 2￿￿ ￿ G 2 ￿
t (￿).






n < tn for n 6= ￿. By symmetry, ￿
ts
(￿) is symmetric around t￿ so there exists
G0 2 ￿
ts
(￿) such that G0 ￿ t￿. Since G0 < G and ts ￿ t, from step 2, G0 2 ￿
t (￿)
and G 2 ￿
ts
(￿). By symmetry, 2￿￿ ￿ G 2 ￿
ts
(￿) and since 2￿￿ ￿ G ￿ G, step 2
implies that 2￿￿ ￿ G 2 ￿
t (￿).
Step 4: if there exists G 2 ￿
t (￿) such that G > t￿, then for almost all ￿ in






















@￿ (￿;￿), with a strict inequality
when one of the inequalities in (21) is strict. From step 3, the median state is indi⁄er-





@￿ (￿;￿)d￿ = 0
for ￿ 2 ft;tsg. From what precedes, this implies that the inequalities in (21) hold
with equality for almost all ￿ in [2￿￿ ￿ G;G].
Step 5: for all G 2 ￿
t (￿), G ￿ t￿.
Suppose G > t￿. For all ￿ 2 RN and n < ￿, let ￿￿
n (￿) be a value of ￿ at which l
jumps from n￿1 to n, i.e.,
￿n+￿x(￿n;￿)
1+￿ = ￿n ￿￿. Since x and ￿n are greater at ￿ = t
than at ￿ = ts, strictly so for ￿n, ￿ts
n (￿) < ￿t
n (￿). Likewise, one can show that the
value of ￿ at which r jumps from n￿1 to n is strictly greater at ￿ = t than at ￿ = ts.
Together with step 4, this implies that l and r are constant on [2￿￿ ￿ G;G] . From
proposition 4, G = 2￿￿ ￿ G = ￿￿ + l￿r
l+r￿ so G = ￿￿.
Proof of Proposition 5. Substituting (2) in (1) and summing over N, the wel-
fare under decentralization is W dec = ￿N
2￿+￿2
1+2￿+￿2var(￿). When j￿n ￿ ￿￿j ￿ j￿m ￿ ￿￿j




n>￿ (￿n ￿ ￿￿)
2.
Let ￿
0 2 RN be triadic preference pro￿le de￿ned by: ￿
0









(￿) = f￿￿ ￿ ￿g. Since ￿ ￿ ￿
0, from proposition 4, ￿
￿0
(￿) ￿ ￿
￿ (￿) so for






+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿. Simple algebra yields that Do
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1.







+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ + 2(￿￿ ￿ ￿1), from what precedes, this inequality holds for
all ￿ ￿ 0. Therefore, when j￿n ￿ ￿￿j ￿ j￿m ￿ ￿￿j for n > ￿ > m, for all ￿ ￿ 0 and
all ￿ 2 ￿
￿ (￿), V (￿;￿) ￿
P
n>￿ (￿n ￿ ￿￿)
2, so V (￿;￿) < W dec.
299.3 Proofs in Subsection 5.2
In the sequel, L(￿) = fl(￿;￿) : ￿ 2 ￿(￿)g and R(￿) = fr(￿;￿) : ￿ 2 ￿(￿)g.
Lemma 4 proves the inequalities in (6). Lemma 3 shows that ￿(￿) has a ￿nite
number of discontinuity in ￿. Lemma 6 and 7 characterize properties of ￿(￿) at its
continuity and discontinuity points.
Lemma 4 The induced preferences of the voters of the median state on x(￿(￿);￿)
are decreasing in ￿. If ￿(￿) is single valued on ]D;D0[ the same is true for the
voters of the states fl + 1;::;N ￿ rg. Moreover, for all ￿ 2 ]D;D0[,












Proof. Suppose that ￿(￿) is single valued on ]D;D0[. From (5), l and r are
constant on ]D;D0[ and (6) for n ￿ l and n > N ￿ r is immediate from (5). For




























(1 + ￿)(l + r) l￿r
l+r + (1 + ￿)(r ￿ l)
N + ￿ (l + r)
= 0:
Therefore, one can see from (1) that the preferences of unconstrained states are de-
creasing on ]D;D0[.
From proposition 3, the median voters are indi⁄erent between all elements of ￿(￿)
and their policy is unconstrained at (￿;￿) for any ￿ 2 ￿(￿). From what precedes,
this implies that the median voters always prefer less discretion.
30Lemma 5 There exists D1;:::; DI (with the convention that D0 = 0, DI+1 = +1)






















is piecewise quadratic in ￿. Since (l;r)
can only take a ￿nite number of values, (L;R)(￿) must be piecewise constant. The
Berge maximum theorem implies that (L;R)(￿) is upper hemi-continuous in ￿,
which implies (23).
Lemma 6 If (￿e;￿e) is a LFE, then ￿(￿) is single valued on ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[ for some
positive " and ￿e = lim￿%￿e ￿(￿).
Proof. Suppose that ￿(￿) is not single-valued on ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[. From (23), ￿(￿e)
is not single-valued. Let ￿o 2 ￿(￿e) such that ￿o 6= ￿e, say ￿o < ￿e for concreteness.
From proposition 3, ￿o = ￿￿ + lo￿ro
lo+ro￿e where (lo;ro) = (l;r)(￿o;￿e) and the voters
from the median state are indi⁄erent between (￿o;￿e) and (￿e;￿e). From lemma 2,




lo+ro (￿e ￿ "0);￿e ￿ "0￿
for some small "0 > 0. From lemma 4,
so do the median voters. From lemma 5, ￿￿ + lo￿ro
lo+ro (￿e ￿ "0) 2 ￿(￿e ￿ "0), hence
￿
￿￿ + lo￿ro
lo+ro (￿e ￿ "0);￿e ￿ "0￿
is a valid deviation from (￿e;￿e) and (￿e;￿e) cannot
be a LFE.




lo+ro (￿e ￿ ");￿e ￿ "
￿
to (￿e;￿e) where (lo;ro) = (l;r)(￿o;￿e) and
￿o = lim￿%￿e ￿(￿).
Lemma 7 Using the notations of lemma 5, (￿e;￿e) is a LFE if and only if there
exists i > 0 such that one of the following is true:
(a) ￿e 2 ]Di￿1;Di[, ￿(￿) is single-valued on ]Di￿1;Di[, ￿(￿e) = f￿eg and majority
preferences on ￿ are strictly single peaked on ]Di￿1;Di[ with a peak at ￿e
31(b) ￿e = Di, ￿(￿) is single-valued on ]Di￿1;Di[, ￿e = lim￿%Di ￿(￿) and majority
preferences on ￿ are increasing on ]Di￿1;Di[.
Proof. If (a) is satis￿ed, (￿e;￿e) is clearly a LFE. Reciprocally, suppose that
(￿e;￿e) is a LFE and ￿e 2 ]Di￿1;Di[. From lemma 6 and 5, ￿(￿) is single-valued
on ]Di￿1;Di[. Therefore, the induced preferences of all voters on x(￿(￿);￿) are
well-de￿ned, quadratic and concave, and not ￿ at by de￿nition of a LFE. Therefore,
majority preferences are strictly quasi-concave on ]Di￿1;Di[, and the conclusion fol-
lows from the median voter theorem.
If (￿e;￿e) is a LFE and ￿e = Di, from lemma 6 and ￿(￿) is single-valued
on ]Di￿1;Di[. Suppose majority preferences are not increasing on ]Di￿1;Di[. As
argued earlier, majority preferences are quasi-concave on ]Di￿1;Di[, so they must be
decreasing on ]Di ￿ ";Di[ for some " > 0. From lemma 6, ￿e = lim￿%Di ￿(￿) and
from what precedes, (￿e;￿e) cannot be a LFE.
Reciprocally, suppose (b) is satis￿ed, then by assumption, there exists " > 0 such
that for all ￿ 2 ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[, (￿(￿);￿) is not preferred by SMR to (￿e;￿e). For
all ￿ 2 ￿(￿e), the median voter is indi⁄erent between (￿e;￿e) and (￿;￿e) so from












. From (5), ￿o ￿ lim￿k exists. Suppose to ￿x ideas that
￿e < ￿o.25 For k su¢ ciently large, ￿e ￿ ￿e < ￿k ￿ ￿k so from lemma 2 and what
precedes, (￿e;￿e) is strictly preferred to
￿
￿k;￿k￿
by leftist states. Finally (￿e;￿e)
is preferred by SMR to
￿
￿k;￿k￿
for k su¢ ciently large.
Proof of proposition 6.
As ￿ ! 0, from proposition 3, all states n such that ￿n 6= ￿￿ must be constrained
and ￿(￿) is single valued. In this case, one can easily see from (1) that Vn (￿(￿);￿)
25From the proof of lemma 5, it should be clear that since G(￿;￿) is single-valued on ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[,
necessarily ￿e 6= ￿o.
32must be increasing in a neighborhood of ￿ = 0.26 Since a majority of states have
a type di⁄erent from ￿￿, ￿ = 0 cannot be a LFE. Since ￿(￿) is single valued on
]D0;D1[, majority preferences are quasi-concave on ]D0;D1[. If they are increasing
on ]D0;D1[, lemma 7 implies that D1 is a LFE. If they are not increasing, from what
precedes, they must be single-peaked and lemma 7 implies that there exists a LFE in
]D0;D1[.
From lemma 7, at any LFE (￿e;￿e), a majority of voters have preferences which
are weakly increasing in ￿ on ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[. From lemma 4, these voters are from
states which are constrained by the federal bounds, which proves that a majority of
states must be constrained at (￿e;￿e).
9.4 Proofs in Section 6










￿ ￿ is bounded
away from 0. One can easily see from (1) and (2) that this implies that all constrained




a) and that the welfare of their voters is strictly increasing in ￿ conditional on
￿ = ￿￿ (part b). Since the welfare of unconstrained states under both regime is
asymptotically equivalent, decentralization is also socially better.
In what follows, ￿
k is a sequence such that ￿












! ￿m for some
state m (independent of k) which is constrained for all k, and (L;R) refer to the map
de￿ned before lemma 5. We assume wlog that for all k, m is constrained by the right
bound.




! (￿o;￿o), for all k,
l￿k ￿
￿k;￿k￿
= lo and r￿k ￿
￿k;￿k￿
= ro for some ￿o;￿o;lo and ro, and ￿m = ￿o +￿o.
26The ￿rst order e⁄ect on ￿jxn ￿ ￿nj





m6=n jxn ￿ xmj
2 is zero.




that (L;R) can only take a ￿nite number of values. To see the last point, observe that
for all k, ￿ x￿k ￿
￿k;￿k￿





so ￿m ￿ ￿o + ￿o. Since m is constrained by the right bound, proposition 1 implies
further that ￿m > ￿k + ￿k, so ￿m ￿ ￿o + ￿o.
Step 2: there exists a subsequence of ￿




converge pointwise to two step functions l(￿) and r(￿) such that lim￿&￿o r(￿) ￿
ro ￿ 1 and lim￿&￿o l(￿) ￿ lo.




are functions of ￿ which are
piecewise constant, bounded and have a bounded number of points of discontinuities
as k ! 1. The existence of l(￿) and r(￿) follows from Bolzano-Weierstrass. From
step 1, for all ￿ > ￿o, for k su¢ ciently large, ￿k < ￿ so limk!1 l￿k ￿
￿;￿k￿
￿ lo.
From step 1 again, ￿m = ￿o + ￿o so for k su¢ ciently large, r￿k ￿
￿;￿k￿
￿ N ￿ m.
Since m is constrained for all k, N ￿ m + 1 ￿ ro.













































￿￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿k￿
+r￿k ￿
￿;￿k￿￿








From proposition 3, ￿k ! ￿￿ + lo￿ro
lo+ro￿o. Together with Step 2 and the dominated

























































34Simple calculus shows that (26) is positive for ￿ su¢ ciently small, which, together
with (25), completes the proof of step 3.









some k and some ￿ > 0, which contradicts proposition 3.
The next lemma will be used in the proof of proposition 8.
Lemma 8 If c(￿) denotes the number of states constrained by the left bound at
(￿ = ￿￿;￿), then at any continuity point of c(:),
for n ￿ c(￿);













for n > N ￿ c(￿);




















and if ￿￿ 2 argmax￿
P














(1 + 2￿)((N ￿ 1))
: (28)
Proof. By symmetry, c(￿) is also the number of states constrained by the right
bound. When no ambiguity arises, the argument of c(:) will be omitted. From (1),
for n ￿ c,











Since ￿ is symmetric,
PN￿c
m=c+1 (￿￿ ￿ xm) = 0. Moreover, from lemma 4, at any points
of continuity of c(:), for all m 2 [c + 1;N ￿ c], @xm
















which implies (27) for n ￿ c, and for n > N ￿c by symmetry. For n 2 fc + 1;N ￿ cg,
from lemma 4, for almost all ￿, @xn






(xn ￿ ￿￿ + ￿)c + 2
￿
N




35If W (￿) =
P















(￿n ￿ ￿￿) ￿ (2 + 4￿)￿
#
: (29)
One can see from (29) that a discontinuity point of c(:) corresponds to a convex kink
of W. So if ￿￿ 2 argmax￿ W (￿), W (￿) is di⁄erentiable at ￿￿ and (28) is derived
from (29) by setting @W
@￿ = 0.
Proof of proposition 8. Part a: if (￿e;￿e) is a LFE, from lemma 6, ￿(￿)
must be single-valued on ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[ for some " > 0. Since ￿ is symmetric, this
means that for all ￿ 2 ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[, ￿(￿) = f￿￿g and lemma 6 implies ￿e = f￿￿g.
So x(￿(￿);￿) and x(￿￿;￿) coincide on ]￿e ￿ ";￿e[. Moreover, from lemma 7,
majority preferences must be increasing on ]￿e ￿ "0;￿e[ for some "0 > 0. States which
voters have increasing preferences on ]￿e ￿ "0;￿e[ necessarily include the N+1
2 states
with the largest j￿n ￿ ￿￿j and from proposition 6, all such states are constrained. For
the voters of these states, at ￿ = ￿e,
@Un(x(￿=￿￿;￿))
@￿ ￿ 0. From (27), this implies that
for a majority of states,


















medn (j￿￿ ￿ ￿nj)
1 + 3=2￿
; (30)
which, together with the inequality in (28), proves part a).






So the equality in (28) implies ￿￿ = ￿
1+2￿. Using the notation of proposition 9, the
symmetry of ￿ implies D￿ = D￿, Do
￿ = Do
￿ and for ￿ su¢ ciently large, D￿ < Do
￿ so
￿




















2 . A close
inspection of the sign of @W













Part c: let ￿




! 0 and let
￿
￿k;￿k￿
be a corresponding sequence of LFE. Wlog, we re-normalize ￿
k by an a¢ ne
transformation so that for all k, ￿
k














! 1. From what precedes, ￿k = 0 and from (30), ￿k is
bounded. This implies that x￿k ￿
￿k;￿k￿















that decentralization is socially better as k ! 1. Under our assumptions, a majority
of states have a bounded type, so since x￿k ￿
￿k;￿k￿




unbounded, a majority of voters strictly prefer
￿
￿k;￿k￿
to decentralization as k ! 1.
Part d: follows from proposition 10 parts a) and d).
9.5 Proofs in Section 7
The next lemma characterizes the second stage equilibrium ￿(￿) for all ￿.











> > > <
> > > :
f￿￿ ￿ ￿g if Do
￿ < Do
￿
f￿￿ + ￿g if Do
￿ > Do
￿




























, U1 (￿;￿(￿;￿);￿) is single-peaked in ￿ with a peak at
D￿ while UN (￿;￿(￿;￿);￿) has a peak at D￿.
Proof. From proposition 3, for all ￿, there are three possible equilibria at the
second stage: either (l;r) = (0;￿) and ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿; or (l;r) = (￿;0) and ￿ = ￿￿ + ￿;
or (l;r) = (￿;￿) and ￿ = ￿￿ +
￿￿￿
￿+￿￿.
37Step 1: derivation of the state equilibrium when (l;r) = (0;￿) and ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿:







































where the second equality is derived by solving the system described by the ￿rst
equality. This solution is possible at ￿ i⁄ the leftist states are indeed unconstrained
at (￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿;￿), i.e.
x1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 2￿ , ￿ ￿ D
0 ￿
N + ￿￿ + ￿￿
2(￿ + 1)(N + ￿￿)
(￿￿ ￿ ￿1):
In this case, substituting (31) in (1), simple algebra yields
V￿ (￿￿ ￿ ￿;￿) = ￿
￿￿(N + ￿￿ + ￿￿)
N (￿ + 1)
2 (N + ￿￿)
(￿￿ ￿ ￿1)
2 : (32)
Step 2: derivation of the state equilibrium when (l;r) = (￿;0) and ￿ = ￿￿ + ￿:








































Substituting (33) in (1), simple algebra yields
V￿ (￿￿ + ￿;￿) = ￿
￿￿(N + ￿￿ + ￿￿)
N (￿ + 1)
2 (N + ￿￿)
(￿N ￿ ￿￿)
2 : (34)
From proposition 3, for any ￿, ￿(￿) are the most preferred ￿ of the voters of the
median state. From (32) and (34), they strictly prefer ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ to ￿ = ￿￿ + ￿ if
and only if
￿(N + ￿￿)(￿￿ ￿ ￿1)






38Step 3: derivation of the state equilibrium when (l;r) = (￿;￿) and ￿ = ￿￿+
￿￿￿
￿+￿￿:,






























Notice that this solution is possible at ￿ if and only if states 1 and N are indeed









N (￿x1 + (N ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)x￿ + ￿xN)
1 + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and
￿N +
￿
N (￿x1 + (N ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)x￿ + ￿xN)
1 + ￿
￿ ￿ + ￿;













































































C C C C
A
(37)
Step 4: Derivation of the second stage equilibrium: from (32) and (37), the voters
of the median state prefer ￿ = ￿￿ +
￿￿￿
￿+￿￿ to ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ if and only if
￿ ￿
s
(￿ + ￿)(N + ￿￿ + ￿￿)
4￿(￿ + 1)
2 (N + ￿￿)
(￿￿ ￿ ￿1) = D
o
￿:
A symmetric reasoning shows that the voters of the median state prefer ￿ = ￿￿+
￿￿￿
￿+￿￿
to ￿ = ￿￿￿￿ if and only if ￿ ￿ Do
￿. Together with (35), this proves that if Do
￿ ￿ Do
￿,
for ￿ > Do









￿, for ￿ > Do















are always satis￿ed,28 which completes the proof of the ￿rst part of the lemma.





































@￿ = 0 i⁄ ￿ = D￿.
Proof of proposition 9. For the sake of brevity, we assume throughout the
proof that Do
￿ > Do










, from lemma 9, the state equilibrium is constant (see. (31))







￿ ￿(￿) 6= ￿￿ + Do























































is the only LFE. By assumption, (￿e;￿e) is preferred by SMR to






￿ , D00 ￿ Do
￿ ￿ D0 can be rewritten
s
(￿ + ￿)(N + ￿￿)
(N + ￿ (￿ + ￿))￿
￿ 1 ￿
s
(N + ￿ (￿ + ￿))￿
(￿ + ￿)(N + ￿￿)
;
which is satis￿ed since x !
N+￿x











(N + ￿ (￿ + ￿))￿
2 (N + ￿￿)
(￿ + ￿)(N + ￿￿)￿(N + ￿￿)
,


















for ￿ < Do
￿. From proposition 3, the voters of the






, from lemma 2 the







is not preferred by SMR to (￿e;￿e). This shows that (￿e;￿e) is a
Condorcet winner among all (￿;￿) such that ￿ 2 ￿(￿)





. From lemma 9, ￿e =
minfD￿;D￿g and ￿e ￿ Do
￿. From lemma 6,
￿






































(￿e;￿e) is a Condorcet winner among all (￿;￿) such that ￿ 2 ￿(￿).
Proof of proposition 10. As ￿ ! 1, D￿ < Do
￿ and D￿ < Do
￿ so ￿e =
minfD￿;D￿g. Suppose to ￿x ideas that D￿ ￿ D￿. From (2), as ￿ ! 1, for all n,
xdec





























2 ! 0. Substituting
￿e = D￿ in (37), we get
lim
￿!1
Vn = ￿(￿n ￿ ￿￿)
2 : (39)
Let W dec and W e denote the welfare under decentralization and at the federal equi-








(￿j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j ￿ ￿j￿N ￿ ￿￿j)
0
@ (2N ￿ 3￿)j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j




41If j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j = j￿N ￿ ￿￿j and ￿ 6= ￿, the left-hand side of (40) is ￿
3(￿￿￿)2j￿1￿￿￿j2
N2 < 0,
which proves part b). If ￿ = ￿ and j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j 6= j￿N ￿ ￿￿j, the left-hand side of (40) is
￿(2N￿3￿)(j￿N￿￿￿j￿j￿1￿￿￿j)2
N2 > 0, which proves part c).
The voters of the median state are always strictly better-o⁄ at the federal equi-
librium than under decentralization.30 If ￿j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j > ￿j￿N ￿ ￿￿j, then ￿ < ￿￿ so
(38) and (39) imply that as ￿ ! 1, Udec
1 > V1 and Udec
N < VN. Likewise, if
￿j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j < ￿j￿N ￿ ￿￿j, then Udec
1 < V1 and Udec
N > VN, which proves the neces-
sary part of part a). If ￿j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j = ￿j￿N ￿ ￿￿j, then simple algebra shows that
x
￿










2￿ and the induced pref-
erences of leftist voters on ￿ conditional on ￿ = ￿￿ +
￿￿￿
￿+￿￿ are quadratic, with a
maximum at ￿ = D￿ by de￿nition of D￿. Therefore, leftist voters are better-o⁄ at
this maximum than under decentralization, which proves part d). By symmetry, if
j￿1 ￿ ￿￿j = j￿N ￿ ￿￿j and ￿ = ￿, all voters are better-o⁄, which completes the proof
of part a).
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